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Intro 
Is there a human right to be governed democratically? And what are the considerations 
that might ground such a right? These are the questions raised in Joshua Cohen’s 2006 
article, ‘Is There a Human Right to Democracy?’ – a paper over which I have agonised 
since I saw it in draft form, many years ago. I am still uncomfortable with its central 
claim, that while justice demands democratic government, the proper standard for 
human rights demands something less. But, as I hope to show, the reasons for that 
discomfort are occasioned less by the thought that democracy may not be a human 
right than by the very significant gaps in our understanding of rights which debates 
about the human rights status of democracy exemplify.  
I therefore start by situating Cohen’s paper within philosophical debates about the 
structure and justification of human rights. I then look at the debate about democracy 
and human rights which it has occasioned, and explain why this debate is not easy to 
resolve. Finally, I point to difficult issues that arise for a philosophy of human rights if 
one accepts, as we probably should, that democratic government is not best thought 
of as a human right, at present. My hope is thereby to contribute to the political 
philosophy of human rights which, I assume, a commitment to democratic government 
requires, whether or not democracy is, itself, an object of human rights.  
Nothing in the arguments about human rights which I examine presuppose an interest 
based, as opposed to a choice based theory of rights (Wenar 2008). However, for the 
sake of simplicity, I will assume that talk of ‘a right’ presupposes the idea of a human 
interest of sufficient moral importance to generate duties that limit what other people 
may morally do. Moreover, I take no stand on how human rights should be enforced, 
or the degree to which they should be treated as legal rights, with legal penalties 
attached for their violation. Instead, in this chapter, I examine the content and 
justification of human rights, understood as a species of moral right, specifying what 
people are entitled to be, to do and to have.  
3 
 
Raz and the problem of understanding human rights 
There is an intuitive, plausible and influential picture of human rights – a picture of 
human rights which many of us grew up on and affirm – on which human rights are a 
subset of moral rights characterised by their special urgency, their universality and the 
fact that they apply to individuals qua individual, regardless of any other characteristics 
which an individual might have (Tasioulas 2012, 1-30) They apply to humans, in other 
words, because they are human, and apply to all members of the human species at all 
times, simply in virtue of the fact that they are human. Their special stringency comes 
from the fact that violations of these rights throw people’s humanity into question – 
the humanity of the violator, as well as the humanity of the violated. And so, whatever 
other moral or legal rights people might have, they will have this set of moral 
entitlements – human rights – whose protection is urgent and incumbent on all other 
humans.  
This appealing and intuitive picture of human rights appears to suggest that the basis 
or grounds for attributing human rights to people is our shared nature as humans. 
However, such a move has, notoriously, led to a bit of a dead-end. It is difficult to see 
what in our nature justifies ascribing to people a distinctive set of universal and 
unchanging rights – a problem made all the more difficult once one allows that 
people’s nature and capacities are fundamentally shaped by their environment. 
Moreover, as Joseph Raz has argued, even if we had a theory of human nature suitable 
to an account of human rights, we would still face the problem that human rights, so 
described, are hard to distinguish from other moral rights (Raz 2010, 321-38). All moral 
rights, after all, appear to have some grounding in our nature, and the way in which 
valuable human capacities can be realised, expressed or thwarted by other people’s 
behaviour. Hence, Raz argued, we should stop trying to locate the content and 
justification of human rights in a theory of human nature and, instead, look to their 
function as a way of distinguishing them from other moral rights.  
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Human rights, Raz argued, have the distinctive function of specifying the necessary, if 
not sufficient, conditions, for one state to be morally justified in interfering in the affairs 
of another: ‘Following Rawls, I will take human rights to be rights which set limits to 
the sovereignty of states, in that their actual or anticipated violation is a (defeasible) 
reason for taking action against the violator in the international arena’ (Raz 2010, 328). 
Examples of such international action, Raz explained, can include  making conformity 
to rights a condition of aid, calling on states to report their conduct re protection of 
human rights, condemning violations, refusing to provide landing or overflight rights, 
trade boycotts and, of course, military intervention. While Rawls defined human rights 
narrowly, such that their violation might justify armed intervention specifically, the 
conception of human rights suggested by Raz is broader and likely to be more closely 
in line with actual political and legal practice (Raz 2010, n. 21). 
However, while Raz’s focus on the function of human rights is helpful, it appears to 
suffer from at least three difficulties. The first, and most obvious, is the implausible and 
unattractive implication that criticism of another state requires us to identify some 
violation of human rights as the source of our complaint (D. Miller 2015b, 234). While 
we’d obviously want to complain about violations of human rights – given that they 
are meant to be especially urgent moral entitlements – the idea that you have to find 
such violations in order publicly to complain about another state’s policy seems to take 
the bounds of state sovereignty too far.  
 
Secondly, what the lower limits of ‘intervention’ are matters to the plausibility of Raz’s 
theory, and its ability to meet Raz’s sensible concern that philosophical theories of 
human rights should have some bearing on what people engaged in the practice of 
human rights actually do and demand (Waldron 2013, 16). But there seems no 
philosophically satisfactory way of specifying what that lower limit should be: indeed, 
as David Miller has argued, there is something counterintuitive in thinking that we 
need a theory of sovereignty and its limits in order to decide what is or isn’t a violation 
of human rights (D. Miller 2015b, 235). Raz’s conception of human rights makes human 
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rights ‘the conclusion of the argument [about legitimate state intervention], not the 
premise’, whereas ‘speaking for myself (and I suspect for many others), I find that when 
I think about intervention, I begin by considering the harms that it is mean to prevent. 
That is, I begin by looking at what I would regard as serious violations of human rights 
– people being driven from their homes, people being deprived of their means of 
subsistence, people being severely “punished” on account of their ethnic or religious 
identities, etc.’ (D. Miller 2015b, 235). Finally, and relatedly, Raz’s approach to human 
rights seemed too thin to capture common intuitions about the special badness of 
violating human rights, compared to the other bad things we might do to each other 
– whether they involve rights-violations or not. The appropriateness of an international 
response seems, in principle, a poor test of the gravity of an action – both because 
morally trivial violations of international trading regimes may require international 
responses whereas there are many horrible things which we might do to each other 
for which international interventions seem too clumsy and indirect a remedy.    Hence, 
even those who sympathised with Raz’s impatience with traditional approaches to 
human rights believe that his own approach is not obviously better.  
Keeping the attractions and difficulties of Raz’s paper in mind helps us to see the 
significance of Cohen’s paper.1 While Cohen agrees with Raz that the function of 
human rights is to explain the limits within which one state can intervene in the affairs 
of another, he insists that this is only because human rights violations undermine 
people’s duties to obey their government; that is, such rights describe the minimal set 
of duties that governments owe to those they govern. ‘Human rights are not rights 
that people are endowed with independent of the conditions of social and political 
life, but rights that are owed by all political societies in light of basic human interests 
and the characteristic threats and opportunities that political societies present for 
                                              
1 Cohen’s paper was only published in 2006, although he had presented it to audiences for a couple of 
years, as an extension of the ‘justificatory minimalism’ about human rights for which he advocated in 
‘Minimalism About Human Rights’ (Cohen 2004, 190 -213). Both papers are now available in Cohen 
(2011). However, all references in this paper are to its original appearance in a collection of essays in 
honour of G.A. Cohen, edited by C. Sypnowich (2006, 226-48). 
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those interests’ (Cohen 2006, 232). Specifying the minimum requirements of political 
obligation, the protection of human rights therefore marks the point at which states 
can rightfully insist on the political obligation of their members, and on the legitimacy 
of their rule in their dealings with other states. As Cohen puts it, if human rights mark 
the point at which individuals have a duty to obey, we can see why it would be morally 
unacceptable for outsiders to intervene militarily in their affairs if such rights are 
upheld (Cohen 2006, 234). And if human rights are sufficiently urgent moral demands 
such that their violation justifies intervention by other states, we have a way of thinking 
about their importance that includes, but is not reducible to, their political function 
(Cohen 2006, 234). 
 
The content of a theory of human rights, according to Cohen, can be explained in 
terms of two different groups of moral entitlements that all individuals have, namely a 
set of basic rights which reflect ‘the demands of basic humanity’2 whether or not we 
are members of a particular society (Cohen 2006, 238), and a broader set of rights 
which can be thought of as rights that reflect a normatively appealing and suitably 
global conception of social inclusion or membership. The first set include traditional 
human rights to life, bodily integrity, personal security and the like; the second set 
reflect the broader set of human rights recognised by the Covenant and its successors, 
such as rights to education, work, cultural inclusion, assembly, expression and 
participation (Cohen 2006, 238). Whereas the first set of rights are the sin qua non of 
human rights protection, so paradigmatic of human rights that they must be given a 
central place in any theory of human rights, the content and justification of the latter 
                                              
2 ‘To be sure, some human rights (e.g. right to life and to personal security) are not tied only to 
membership but are also more plausibly associated with demands of basic humanity, irrespective of 
membership in an organized political society. But the guiding thought behind the more capacious lists 
in the principal human rights instruments seems to be that an acceptable political society – one that is 
above reproach in its treatment of individuals – must attend to the common good of those who are 
subject to its regulations…and ensure the goods and opportunities that people in the territory and those 
subject to political rule need in order to take part in the political society’ (Cohen 2006, 238).  
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is more controversial. Cohen’s idea is that if we think of this broader list as a 
specification of what it takes to see someone as a member of society – rather than an 
outsider, whose wellbeing is of no special concern to members or to their government 
(Cohen 2006, 239) – we can formulate an account of human rights that is 
philosophically compelling and capable of illuminating and guiding human rights 
practice.  
  
Specifically, Cohen suggests, understanding the point of human rights as the 
specification of internationally compelling moral norms of membership enables us to 
acknowledge that human rights are merely a part of any account of justice, albeit an 
important part. He thereby hopes to avoid both over-expansive conceptions of human 
rights, which lose sight of their politically important function, and a too minimal list of 
human rights focused on the right of bodily integrity. The point of human rights, as 
Cohen sees it, is to mark globally relevant claims of political obligation, such that any 
reasonable person will, on reflection, be able to agree that states which protect these 
two sets of human rights are ‘decent’, albeit unjust in various ways. Therefore, Cohen 
argues, we should think of human rights as those rights that are necessary for us to 
see a society as ours, as demonstrably reflecting our wellbeing and, therefore, entitled 
to our obedience.3 
 The importance and challenge of Cohen’s argument, I hope, are reasonably plain. For 
example, if we take the critique by Tasioulas of all ‘political’ theories of human rights, 
on the grounds that these seem to apply only to an international system of states 
(Tasioulas 2012, 26–27), we can note that whatever may be the case for Raz, Cohen 
                                              
3 ‘Regulations cannot impose obligations of compliance on those who are subject to them unless the 
regulations reflect a concern with their good. If an account of political obligation along these lines is 
correct – and it is more plausible than a theory of obligation that makes the justness of processes and 
outcomes a necessary condition for political obligations – the rights that are required if individuals are 
to be treated as members would be identical to those that are required if the requirements imposed by 
law and other regulations are to be genuine obligations’ (Cohen 2006, 239). 
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has a natural and persuasive response. Cohen’s theory of human rights is a theory of 
the necessary moral conditions of political obligation, and not a theory that assumes 
modern states are – or ought to be – the sole bearers of political obligation.4 Any body 
– whether a family, tribe, a pre-modern state or a post-modern state – that claims our 
obedience, and a right to rule over us, is to that extent the object of human rights 
evaluation. Cohen’s article provides a political approach to human rights – an approach 
based on their political function – which is consistent with the universality of human 
rights. As Catherine MacKinnon has argued, drawing inspiration from Eleanor 
Roosevelt, judgements of human rights should be as much at home in domestic 
politics as in international relations (Catherine MacKinnon, 1993, 83 -110.) For example, 
rape is a violation of human rights whether or not it occurs in a war zone or in a 
shopping centre, and states have duties to prevent its occurrence, adequately to 
identify and punish its perpetrators, and to support and aid its victims, as part of their 
ordinary domestic politics, as well as their relations with other states.  
Likewise, Cohen’s conception of human rights appears helpfully to combine ‘political’ 
and more ‘traditional’ approaches to human rights. For example, it gets the direction 
of argument right, in the sense that it is the importance of the interests which human 
rights articulate and protect that explains the ability of human rights to function as 
markers of the limits of sovereignty, rather than the other way around, as with Raz. 
And, the idea of human rights as membership rights provides a natural interpretation 
of their moral importance, independent of their political function, and provides a 
regulative ideal with which to evaluate competing claims about what should count as 
a human right.  
Still, it should be noted that on Cohen’s theory, it is possible that we do not have a 
human right to be a member of a political society. How troubling that is – if it’s true – 
depends on what we would lose (conceptually, morally or politically) by insisting on a 
                                              
4 This also strikes me as the appropriate way to read Rawls’ Law of People’s. If so, Rawls is also immune 
to this objection by Tasioulas.  
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right to be a member of some society, as opposed to a right against wrongful 
deprivation of membership from a particular society. However, while we may want to 
return to the question of whether there is a human right to be a member of society – 
that most Arendtian of rights- I will turn to the other challenges that come with 
Cohen’s picture of human rights, and the controversies about democracy and equality 
which they have occasioned. According to Cohen, there is no human right to be 
governed democratically although, as Rawls argued, we have human rights to be 
consulted by our government, (at least in some form) and to criticise it.5  
No Human Right to Democracy? 
According to Cohen, democracy is a demand of justice, but it is not therefore required 
by a theory of human rights (Cohen 2006, 233ff). Not everything that justice requires 
is a human right and the bounds between the two are set, on Cohen’s view, by the 
best interpretation of what it is to be a member of a society, according to a global 
conception of public reason. We are concerned with a global, rather than a domestic, 
conception of public reason, according to Cohen, because the point of human rights 
is global and not purely domestic: namely to determine the moral requirements that 
states must meet to be able justifiably to demand the obedience of their members, 
and the recognition/acceptance of their legitimacy internationally. What is at issue are 
internationally binding norms of (political) morality (Cohen 2006, 243).  
In short, global public reason, according to Cohen, will not always treat democratic 
government as a norm of justice – although one day, perhaps, this will turn out to be 
the case. Global public reason, for Cohen, refers to the terms of argument and 
justification used in discussing the conduct of different political societies, and is 
therefore meant to function as a common moral and political resource with which 
                                              
5 According to Cohen (2006, 233), human rights include ‘a requirement of collective self-determination’, 
which requires a political process that represents the diverse interests and opinions of those bound by 
collective decisions; rights to dissent and appeal those decisions; and a government that normally 
justifies and explains decisions to people and does so with reference to their collective good. However, 
diverse political interests may not be equally represented politically.  
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peoples ‘in a deeply pluralistic world’, can determine their collective life and rules of 
conduct (Cohen 2006, 236). At least at present, Cohen thinks, people who are 
reasonable and willing to live in peace with others may simply not hold the full set of 
moral and political views that are necessary to see democratic government as a 
requirement of justice. While able to recognise and affirm rights freely to worship, to 
form consensual family arrangements, to give one’s input into the way that one is 
governed and to criticise governments who ignore that input, people may nonetheless 
reasonably deny that being a full member of society requires something more (Cohen 
2006, 244). Indeed, they may insist that they feel themselves to be full members of 
their society even though they are governed by a hereditary monarch; suffer from 
some disabilities because of their sex, race, ethnicity and/or religion; and even if they 
accept that such disabilities would be threats to their sense of belonging, or of 
membership, if they lived in some other type of society.6  
Moreover, Cohen argues, it is a mistake to suppose that democratic political 
institutions can be sharply distinguished from democratic social ones – from forms of 
sociability, ways of organising work, family life, leisure, for example, which depend on 
distinctive views about the moral freedom and equality of human beings (Cohen 2006, 
240–42). To suppose that democracy is a human right means that people have an 
especially urgent duty to organise their basic institutions, not just their narrowly 
                                              
6 I put the point this way because it is an implication of Cohen’s paper, I assume, that it is not just 
ignorance of the relevant alternatives that explains people’s beliefs about their situation and society. 
Moreover, some position like this seems necessary to counter the claims of those, like Gilabert or 
Christiano, who appear to suppose that people must first be members of a democratic society before 
we can reasonably ascribe to them a legitimising belief that some non-democratic but ‘decent’ society 
is morally compelling for them. (Christiano 2015, 466–68; Gilabert 2012, 12–13). It’s true that 
philosophers can’t grant people’s current beliefs and desires unquestioned normative status. But it’s 
one thing to insist that people should be aware of the alternatives and have the freedom openly to 
discuss them (and their personal and collective relevance) and another to insist that they must do so 
from within a democratic political set up – as though the latter were magically free of all the epistemic 
or deliberative failings of liberal but undemocratic regimes, or unlikely to suffer from their own specific 
problems (Lever and Chin 2017; Peter 2015, 487–89). 
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political ones, along the lines implied by a democratic view of personal and collective 
choice; and that we owe particularly urgent duties of aid to all those who are not yet 
members of such a society, regardless of their situation.  
But do we have such duties?  As David Miller has argued, it’s not clear how morally 
urgent it is to make the transition from being a decent but undemocratic society – 
along the lines, perhaps, of England before the First World War - to being both decent 
and democratic (D. Miller 2015a, 179–80, 188–89).7  Indeed, Cohen worries that the 
only way to make a human right to democracy anything other than a sectarian and 
intolerant vision of global justice, and to motivate its urgency, is to use so thin a 
conception of ‘democracy’ that we lose much of its moral and political appeal.8  
The importance of democracy? 
Two main arguments have been raised against Cohen’s claim that democracy isn’t a 
human right. The first is that even if democracy is not justified directly by a political 
conception of human rights, we should consider it to be justified indirectly or 
instrumentally, on the grounds that democratic government is necessary to the secure 
enjoyment of one’s human rights or, at least, probably the best way to secure them 
(Christiano 2015, 2011; Gilabert 2012). The second argument is that given the non-
instrumental value of democracy, we have reasons to suppose that it should figure on 
the list of human rights directly – although Tom Christiano suggests that respect for 
self-government means that people’s may, with universal consent, decide in favour of 
something less than democratic governance as an exercise of their human rights, 
rather than as a derogation from them (Christiano 2015, 468–79, 2013, 318–20). 
                                              
7 Miller notes that ‘[i]t is important to distinguish the position of someone deprived of democratic rights 
in a society that otherwise extends these rights to all citizens, from the position of someone who lives 
in an undemocratic society’ (D. Miller 2015a, n. 10). 
8 ‘[D]emocracy is a demanding political ideal. The thesis that there is a human right to democracy – 
while it may seem to elevate democracy – threatens to strip away its demanding substance’ (Cohen 
2006, 227). 
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I’m sympathetic to both these arguments. However, they share a difficulty (which 
Cohen noted in his original paper): that for these arguments to work, we must be able 
to distinguish the value of democracy (instrumentally and non-instrumentally) from 
the value of constitutional government, rule of law, and some non-democratic forms 
of collective decision-making (see also Peter 2015, 485–87). Many of the alleged 
reasons to instrumentally value democratic government are reasons to want our 
governments to be constitutional and to protect freedom of movement, association 
and expression. They do not seem to point to any special virtue of democratic 
government, over and above these features. For example, Amartya Sen is famous for 
noting that democracies do not have famines (Sen 1999, chap. 7), and he notes the 
dreadful famine that took place under Mao, after the Great Leap Forward. However, ‘in 
the period after the Great Leap Forward, China also lacked collective self-
determination, the rule of law, and (as Sen emphasizes) protections of speech, press 
and assembly. It is hard to know whether to lay the responsibility [for avoiding famine] 
specifically on the doorstep of democracy’ (Cohen 2006, 245; see also D. Miller 2015a, 
181).9 
The question of how to distinguish democratic from undemocratic, but constitutional, 
government is a matter which has received relatively little philosophical reflection and, 
such attention as it has received, has reflected questionable assumptions about the 
liberal character of constitutional government, and its status as legal rather than a 
political arrangement.10 Yet resolving disagreement on the human rights status of 
democracy depends on developing a philosophically satisfactory conception of 
                                              
9 Miller (2015a, 181–83) quotes from, and discusses, Sen’s claims. 
10 See Richard Bellamy’s interesting discussion of the differences between legal and political 
constitutionalism in Bellamy (2007) and, on the reasons why we cannot distinguish constitutional from 
democratic government simply by identifying universal suffrage and the right to vote with the latter, 
see Cohen (1996) and Lever & Chin (2017). David Miller (2015a, 184) also notes the problems of legalism 
that may arise if we see democracy as a human right, rather than thinking of the solutions to social 
conflict in terms of ‘political sociology’ and the virtues of power-sharing arrangements ‘in which leaders 
drawn from different factions have an incentive to reach compromises and to promote moderate 
solutions among their followers. Such regimes usually require quite elaborate constitutional 
engineering…Electoral mechanisms may be part of the set up, but they are by no means the most 
important part’.  
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constitutional government - one that enables us to distinguish the rights, duties and 
status protected by constitutional, as opposed to democratic, government on a variety 
of plausible conceptions of constitutional government and democracy.  
But progress on this philosophical debate, I believe, also depends on what we can learn 
from empirical cases that mark the theoretical differences between decent but 
hierarchical societies, as Cohen understands them, and their democratic equivalents. 
We may therefore learn something from cases such as Britain, before 1918 and the 
extension of votes to all men over the age of 21 and to women over the age of 30, and 
on equal terms in 1928; or Switzerland before and after universal suffrage in 1971, 
(although some cantons had already granted women the vote, and Appenzell only did 
so in 1991). We might also consider the Nordic countries and Liechtenstein, which 
finally granted women the vote in 1984. Careful study of these cases might help to 
clarify how far – or in what circumstances – democratic rights are necessary to combat 
abuses of human rights that are not adequately prevented by constitutional means 
alone; and might also help to clarify conceptual, as well as normative and social-
theoretic, questions about the differences between constitutional government as a 
democratic, and as an undemocratic, ideal.11  
Sadly, it is too late to be able to ask the men and women who lived through the 
transition to universal suffrage in Britain to reflect on the instrumental and non-
instrumental value of the vote – though doing so would provide helpful insight into 
the way that class, ethnicity and national identity affected one’s experience of 
constitutional as well as democratic government. However, it is not too late to use 
survey research, as well as other means, to investigate the Swiss case. Granted, that the 
Swiss case is rather special, given that by the 1970s Switzerland was a fairly egalitarian 
                                              
11 Grant Miller (2008) is an ingenious approach to the question, using the different points at which 
American states granted women the vote to investigate questions about women’s voting rights and 
child survival. Many thanks to Simon Wigley for bringing this to my attention. See Simon Wigley and 
Arzu Akkoyunlu-Wigley (2017) for an excellent discussion of the most recent literature on democracy 
and this aspect of human rights, and an attempt to control for the different aspects of democracy, and 
to distinguish democracy from ‘good government’.  
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and consensual society, (certainly as compared to nineteenth century Britain, let alone 
the Empire), and its justification of ‘hierarchy’ was, to that extent, rather limited. 
However, it is one of the few examples we have of a ‘decent but hierarchical’ society 
in which there was subsequently a peaceful transition to democratic government. It 
therefore merits attention by philosophers, as well as more empirical social scientists, 
for the light it sheds on the differences between democratic and undemocratic 
constitutionalism, and the significance of those differences for the protection of 
human rights.  
That’s not to say that ‘decent but hierarchical’ societies must be constitutional 
governments in the ways typical of European countries, with a formal separation of law 
and politics, and a specialised legal apparatus employing people with specialised legal 
knowledge, training and careers. Even if one believes that human rights include a right 
to be governed democratically, it is unclear how far ‘the separation of powers’ and the 
development of specialised legal institutions are required for a society to be human 
rights-protecting. However, because the relative causal importance of constitutional 
government and democratic government are at issue in instrumental and non-
instrumental claims about the human-rights status of democracy, it can be helpful to 
use actual cases to test and refine our conceptual, normative and factual assumptions.  
 Democracy of What? 
In addition to the difficulty of distinguishing democratic from constitutional 
government there is a second difficulty with current debate on democracy and human 
rights – a difficulty to which Cohen’s reference to a ‘democratic society’ points, but 
does not resolve (Cohen 2006, 240–41). The working assumption of the current debate 
– though largely implicit – has been that democracy is identified with the right to vote 
and, to a lesser extent, the right to stand as an elected representative.12 But there 
appear to be many different ways in which our relations with one another might be 
                                              
12 Ludvig Beckman (2017, 7) aptly notes the equivocation between having a right to vote and exercising 
that right in arguments for the instrumental importance of democracy to the protection of human rights. 
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conducted democratically, and it is uncertain that voting for political representatives 
to a national legislature every few years is the most important form of democracy, if 
we care about human rights. ‘Workplace democracy’, ‘village democracy’, or the 
chance to participate in the determination of water and land rights in one’s region, or 
in the policing of one’s locality, may be much more important to how one’s life goes, 
to one’s bodily integrity and to one’s sense of being a full member of society than the 
right to elect a representative to a legislative body which may be as psychologically 
remote as it is geographically distant. Beyond this, there are many important social 
positions that influence one’s human rights, including serving on the police force and 
teaching.  
Perhaps, then, access to key jobs is, in some circumstances, more important than a 
right to vote on instrumental grounds? Or perhaps the form of democracy that best 
makes sense within a theory of human rights is some form of local, regional, even pan-
national democracy, rather than democracy at the level of national government? Put 
simply, then, further progress in this debate clearly depends on the ability to determine 
what a human right to democracy is a right to do or decide, given that there seem to 
be many forms of democratic organisation and decision-making, of which 
representative democracy, as currently conceived, is only one. In short, whether or not 
we agree with Cohen, his conclusions remind us how little we know about the 
relationship between constitutionalism and democracy, on the one hand, and the 
varieties of democratic government, on the other.  
Some final points about the importance and challenges of Cohen’s paper 
It is an unfortunate feature of the interest about human rights and democracy, which 
Cohen’s paper has caused, that other aspects of his theory of human rights have been 
neglected. I close this chapter by pointing to some of these issues and their 
significance for an account of human rights that takes seriously the ubiquity, 
complexity and moral significance of our capacities for collective association and of 
coercion.  
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1) The relationship amongst the claims of humanity and membership 
Recall that on Cohen’s theory, global public reason determines what claims to 
membership make up a conception of human rights. As he sees it, it would be sectarian 
and, possibly, authoritarian and paternalistic, to insist on the correctness of 
incorporating ‘our’ core convictions about justice into an account of human rights that 
is meant to bind everyone. However, it is unclear that we can sharply distinguish 
between those ‘basic’ human rights, which Cohen takes to be uncontroversial elements 
of global public reason, and ‘democratic government’, with its attendant, and 
controversial, forms of social equality.  
 
All societies, as Stuart Hampshire has claimed, condemn murder, rape and theft 
(Hampshire 1991). However, their reasons for doing so are often fundamentally at odds 
with basic ideas of human rights. (Hampshire, 1991, 142-6, 187; and Hampshire 1993). 
Unfortunately, many people, and many societies, condemn rape, murder and theft 
because of the harms that they do to people other than the victim. They may see 
murder as form of theft of the property of a king or a lord; or condemn rape because 
it disgraces husbands, fathers and brothers. They may deny that forced unremunerated 
labour (corvée) is a form of theft, and see wives as the property of their husbands. So, 
the idea that harms caused to the victim are a sufficient reason to condemn murder, 
rape and theft may be quite alien even in societies that actively condemn these 
activities, and punish them, (when recognised) very severely. Such societies will actively 
deny that governments have a duty to consider the wellbeing of all the individuals on 
their territory, or to take their good into account.  
 
Those who deny that everyone’s life has non-instrumental value will not count as 
reasonable, on Cohen’s view of global public reason. But many of the people who find 
democratic social and political equality morally unacceptable, despite apparently 
condemning murder, rape and theft, may hold unreasonable views of this kind. That 
is, they believe that the lives and bodily integrity of people who are of the ‘wrong’ sort 
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do not generate the sort of moral claims of those who are of the ‘right’ kind. Moreover, 
even if they agree that the wellbeing of all human beings counts morally, they may 
deny that they should do so equally, even in the case of basic rights of bodily integrity 
and security. So it is necessary to understand how the rights demanded by ‘humanity’, 
on Cohen’s account of human rights, are to be described and justified consistent with 
global public reason; and how these are to be justified and maintained in societies 
which accept and, even, require departures from equality on paternalistic grounds, or 
based on claims of tradition, harmony, community, faith and/or reason. 
 
Unfortunately, Cohen’s article is unhelpful here, because in it, he never states explicitly 
that decent hierarchical societies must accord women’s lives and bodily integrity the 
same importance as those of men. Cohen appears to believe that equal rights to bodily 
integrity are a necessary part of a theory of human rights, although equal political 
rights are not – that the former are necessary for us to suppose that our personal good 
does figure in some reasonable, but hierarchical, conception of a common good. 
However, Cohen says nothing explicitly on the subject, nor is it clear what personal or 
civil inequalities he would consider to be unjust, but consistent with seeing oneself as 
a full member of one’s society. It seems fair to suppose that the sorts of decent but 
hierarchical relations he has in mind are ones in which marriages may be arranged by 
parents, but with children’s good in mind and subject to their agreement; in which 
women’s claims to bodily integrity are recognised by courts and their testimony 
against men is taken seriously, although women are assumed to have distinctive rights 
and duties as compared to men. But as these examples reveal, we cannot sharply 
distinguish people’s claims to bodily integrity from their claims to a say in parental and 
marital relationships, or their ability successfully to defend their interests in a court – 
or its equivalent.  
 
It is therefore hard to decide what forms of inequality are violations of human rights, 
from those which – however unjust – do not threaten either our humanity or a globally 
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satisfactory ideal of social membership. There may be relatively few ways to justify 
political inequality, consistent with global public reason, once one accepts universal 
(and, especially, equal) rights of bodily integrity, and their implications for fair trials, 
freedom from torture, wrongful imprisonment and the like. If so, human-rights 
protecting societies will protect substantively more or less the same set of rights, 
regardless of a person’s sex, gender, religion or ethnicity even if the form those rights 
take, and the way that they are justified, are communal or communitarian, rather than 
general or universalistic. On the other hand – and more troublingly – perhaps it is 
reasonable to see a society as ‘ours’ even if our wellbeing counts less, (while still 
counting), than that of other members of our society? If so, ‘decent but hierarchical’ 
societies could be caste societies which, while insisting that governments owe duties 
of care and consultation to all members, deny that people’s bodily integrity, dignity 
and well-being are of equal importance. 13 
 
It might seem that we can avoid these difficulties by abandoning the idea of a political 
approach to human rights – one which tries to read important elements of their 
content and justification off their function, rather than off alleged claims about human 
nature. Instead, we may want to insist that these problems in determining the content 
and justification of human rights, and the extent to which they require personal, civil 
and political equality, are simply artefacts of a mistaken way of thinking about them 
(Tasioulas 2012).  
 
Basing human rights on nature, rather than politics, on this view, inevitably precludes 
questions about the relative strength of people’s claims to bodily integrity; the 
implications for civil and political equality of their right to practice a religion; or the 
                                              
13 Rawls, 1999, para9, pp.71-72 develops the idea of a consultation hierarchy and, p. 77 clarifies the 
idea that ‘ each groups must be represented by a body that contains at least some of the group’s own 
members who know and hsare the fundamental interests of the group’.  So while it is possible that 
decent hierarchical societies might be caste societies, in the sense that people are born into different 
positions on a social hierarchy, with little if any mobility, they are nonetheless entitled to some forms 
of representation and self-representation. 
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relationship between people’s instrumental and non-instrumental interests in basic 
rights.  
While natural, such a position is mistaken. The problem of determining which injustices 
are violations of human rights and which are not is not an artefact of the political 
conception of human rights, but of the discourse of human rights itself. Assuming that 
we are equally human, and therefore equally deserving of human rights, leaves open 
the question of what protections for our bodily integrity, freedom and dignity we are 
entitled to, and how these are to be distinguished from those forms of equal protection 
which justice requires morally and politically.  
For example, what rights against discrimination in job opportunities, promotion and 
pay are required by human rights? As Miller notes (2015a, 186), laws that prevent 
discrimination at work and in education plausibly have a protective function – making 
it more difficult to deprive minorities of the ability to meet their basic needs, and to 
participate in the social, cultural and political life of their society. However, it is unclear 
what forms of equality would be justified by commitment to human rights – what 
forms of equal access to education and jobs, for example; what forms of equal pay and 
promotion? As Miller also notes, a purely protective case for antidiscrimination laws is 
unlikely to condemn those forms of discrimination that affect the relatively wealthy, 
well-educated and well-connected; on the other hand, it is unclear whether there is a 
convincing non-instrumental case for  insisting on formal equality in all cases, let alone 
something more substantive (D. Miller 2015a, 186–87). Thus, whatever perspective on 
the philosophy of human rights one adopts, philosophical progress now requires the 
careful presentation and comparison of those injustices that do, and those that do not, 
violate human rights on competing conceptions of their content and justification.  
 
2. The problem of suboptimal equilibria, dynamics and undemocratic governments 
Cohen’s theory of human rights, of course, is consistent with democratic government 
as an element of human rights, depending on how global public reason evolves. But 
as it is, as it has been and, perhaps, as it is likely to be in future, it looks as though 
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global public reason precludes a human right to democracy. If we see democracy as 
necessary for justice, however – and as an important, not a trivial element, of a theory 
of justice – it would be odd to conclude that a commitment to human rights should 
leave us indifferent between democratic and undemocratic government.  
 
If that’s so, then the differences amongst human rights-respecting governments merits 
further attention in a political approach to human rights. In particular, there are two 
reasons. First, because if justice requires democracy, we cannot be indifferent to the 
differences between democratic and undemocratic government, even if both are 
consistent with human rights. Within ‘our’ conception of human rights, therefore, there 
should be room for a story about the instrumental and non-instrumental value of 
democracy as, in some way, a more perfect expression of the moral and political 
commitments that underpin human rights (even if they exclude a right to democracy). 
Rawls (1999, 70, 84) persuasively argues that all human-rights protecting regimes must 
be treated as equally satisfactory for many practical purposes, and as having each 
cleared a morally significant hurdle. Hence, as he says, it would be wrong for 
democratic, but human rights-protecting, states to gang up on those which are 
human-rights protecting but undemocratic, or to offer the latter a lesser voice in 
collectively binding deliberations, or less consideration for their interests.  Yet, on the 
other hand, Rawls clearly assumes that democracies might help human rights-
protecting, but undemocratic societies to become democratic  (84-5, though he 
emphasises that while private groups may offer subsidies and incentives, democratic 
states themselves may not) thereby begging the question of what undemocratic 
societies might do consistent with the law of peoples to promote transitions from 
democracy towards their favoured form of government. In short, how we should think 
about the moral and political differences amongst human-rights protecting regimes 
bears careful consideration whatever one’s view on the human rights status of 
democracy, given the differences between the demands of human rights and other 
essential requirements of justice. The issue is likely to have real practical importance, 
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once one considers the familiar problem of ‘suboptimal equilibria’ or the reasons why 
human-rights protecting governments may be unable peacefully to ‘transition’ to 
democracy, or to other criteria we hold to be fundamental for social justice.  
 
Just because different countries are equally good at protecting human rights, it does 
not follow that they are equally good from the perspective of ‘justice’ more generally. 
In particular, it surely should matter to us, if we believe democracy necessary for justice, 
that some countries that protect human rights may have a more difficult time 
peacefully transitioning to democratic government than others – because of the 
incentives on which they depend, for example, or the implicit and explicit rewards and 
penalties with which they operate. 14 As democrats, we might want to be able to argue 
in favour of the latter type of regime, as compared to the former, even though they 
are both human-rights protecting – and to do so not merely in philosophical 
discussions with the like-minded, but as parts of ordinary politics. In short, as 
democrats we may want our philosophy of human rights to mark the morally and 
politically significant differences between democratic and undemocratic governments, 
even if democracy is not required for human rights; and we may want to mark the 
differences amongst types of undemocratic government that are human-rights 
protecting depending on whether or not they are likely to trap people in what we can 
only regard as a suboptimal equilibrium. (Rawls tends to overlook this possibility, as 
he seems to suppose that decent societies will have a fairly smooth path to democracy, 
even if they may want to ask already democratic societies for help and advice. The 
possibility that a decent society might create desires, expectations and disabilities that 
block peaceful transitions to democracy is not seriously considered). A more explicit 
                                              
14 Miller (2015a, 183–84) has an excellent discussion of the problem of transition as part of a reason for 
thinking that democracy may not be a human right – or, indeed, the best way to protect even the most 
urgent human rights. As he notes, ethnic and religious minorities may be better protected by some form 
of consociational arrangement that falls short of democracy than by democratic government in its 
majoritarian forms. The worry, in particular, is that democratic elections mean that ‘Rulers who can 
mobilize electoral majorities and thereby gain legitimacy are able to sweep away balancing institutions 
that beforehand had held them in check’ (2015a, 183). However, the problem of transition matters, as 
long as we think democracy necessary for justice, even if we doubt that it is a human right.  
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commitment to democratic government, therefore, may need to be part of our 
philosophy of human rights – even if it cannot be part of the philosophical justification 
of human rights to every human-rights-respecting country – and the same may 
perhaps be true for some socio-economic rights that are not plausibly thought of as 
human rights, such as the Difference Principle or Fair Equality of Opportunity, and their 
equivalents.  
   
Concluding questions 
I close with 3 questions raised by Cohen’s account of human rights.  
1) Is democracy merely an ‘optional extra’ or a matter of indifference, from the 
perspective of human rights and, if not, how do those of us who think about 
democracy as a requirement of justice incorporate our sense of its importance into our 
accounts of human rights? 
2) How should we incorporate the dynamic, as opposed to static, elements of a 
theory of human rights, such that it is possible to capture, from with a theory of human 
rights, the concerns for justice that motivate a concern for human rights, even if human 
rights are only one element (albeit important) of a theory of justice? 
3) How are we to make sense of the special urgency of human rights, relative to 
other moral concerns, whether rights-based or not?  In particular, how are we to do so 
while acknowledging that people may reasonably disagree about the relative 
importance and justification of different human rights, even when they agree upon the 
content of the (provisional) set of human rights? It is often unclear what ‘urgency’ 
means in the case of other moral rights, given their heterogenous character, internal 
complexity and so forth. (Waldron, 1993, chs 1 and 2, in particular). We therefore lack 
a clear sense of the ‘urgency’ of rights in general that we can adapt to the case of 
human rights in particular.15 The importance of gaining greater clarity on the urgency 
                                              
15 Gilabert (2012, 27) is helpful here – though brief. Urgency should be judged in terms of three criteria: 
(a) the moral importance of the interests at stake; (b) the likelihood and severity of the threats or 
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of human rights, however, is philosophical as well as practical. The Rawls/Razian 
challenge to the traditional view of human rights made clear that the political function 
of human rights in international relations can illuminate their distinctive content and 
justification. But it also exposes how uncertain philosophers are about what counts as 
‘normal’ practice and, more troublingly, what should count as an appropriate response 
to violations of human rights. Without greater clarity on the special urgency of human 
rights, relative to other rights and relative to non-rights-based reasons for action, it 
will be hard to make much progress on these matters.  
 
Critics of the ‘political turn’ in human rights theory, such as John Tasioulas, complain 
that these theories fail adequately to reflect human rights practice, and that they 
challenge accepted and intuitively appealing ideas of human rights. These critics, 
however, appear to identify human rights practice in an unduly optimistic way – 
ignoring widespread failures to protect human rights and the recognised doubts and 
quandaries which a commitment to human rights poses for human rights practitioners, 
as for politicians and citizens. Perhaps philosophy cannot help much with the former 
and, as Rawls argued, philosophy is no substitute for political courage, knowledge and 
luck (Rawls 1999, 93, 97).  Nonetheless, I suspect, that it is only by integrating our 
theories of human rights into political philosophy and, specifically, into democratic 
political philosophy, that we will be able to make progress in answering the difficult 
questions about human rights to which Cohen’s important, and provocative, article 
points.  
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